Phenomena such as conflict, transference, resistance, and the unconscious itself are grasped fromthis perspective asdynamicallyemergent properties of self-organizing, nonlinear, dyadic, intersubjective systems. The conception ofdevelopment as evolv ing and dissolving attractor states of intersubjective systems richly illuminates the processes of pattern formation and change in psychoanalysis. Effective interpreta tions are seen as perturbations of the therapeutic system that permit new organizing principles to come into being.
In this article I present an overview of some basic tenets of dynamic systems theory, drawing heavily from the work of developmentalists Thelen and Smith (1994) . Interspersed throughout thediscussion areexamples of how systems theory has already infiltrated my thinking about fundamental psychoanalytic issues. I conclude by applying the principles of dynamic systems to a conceptualization of the process of change and resistance to change in psychoanalysis.
Within ageneral systems philosophy (Laszlo, 1972; Sucharov, 1994) ,any living system is partof a hierarchy. Each system contains subsystems, or elements, that constitute the whole. Two or more systems interacting cooperatively form a suprasystem. Conceptualizations of psychological development that focus on the child's mental activity as the system under study (e.g., Thelen & Smith, 1994) highlight the exquisitely context-dependent nature of the child's self-regulatory processes astheseinfluenceand areinfluencedby exchanges withcaregivers. Other formulations (e.g., Sander, 1985) enterthe living hierarchy atthe more encompass ing level of the child-caregiver suprasystem and emphasize the ongoing processes of reciprocal mutual regulation within the dyad. Self-regulation and mutual regu lation always occur simultaneously and are inextricably interrelated (Beebe & Lachmann, 1994) . One or anotherwill predominate as a function of the level ofthe living hierarchy targetedby the investigator. Because psychoanalytic investigation is concerned with comprehending the process of change within the patient-analyst relationship, the level of thehierarchy most relevant to psychoanalysis isthe dyadic system. Furthermore, because the focus of psychoanalytic investigation is always psychic, orsubjective, reality-the particular dyadic systems formed by therecip rocal interplay between worlds of experience (i.e., intersubjective systems) consti tute the unique domain of inquiry of psychoanalysis. Therefore, I havechosenthe phrase dynamic, dyadic, intersubjective systems to capture the nature of a new, evolving paradigm for psychoanalysis.
To summarize, I am concerned here with systems concepts existing at three levels of abstraction and generality. The most general and inclusive is the over arching conceptof dynamic systems,and the application of principles of dynamic systems to psychoanalysis is thecentral aim of thisarticle. A specific category of dynamicsystemscomprises systemsformed by the interaction betweentwo human beings (dyadic systems). More specific still are those formed by the interplay between two subjective worlds (intersubjective systems), the unique domain of psychoanalytic inquiry. The concept of a dynamic, dyadic, intersubjective system mends the long-standing false dichotomy in psychoanalysis betweenintrapsychic and interpersonal theorizing because it brings to focus boththe individual's world of innerexperience and the embeddedness of this worldwith othersuch worlds in a continual flow ofreciprocal mutual influence (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992,p. 18) . From a dynamic systems perspective, the very distinction between one-and two-person psychologies is obsolete because the individual and his or her intra psychic world are included as asubsystem within themore encompassing ihtersub- DYNAMIC. DYADIC, INTERSUBJECTIVE SYSTEMS 339 jective suprasystem. For this reason, I have sometimes quipped that perhaps my theoretical viewpoint is a "no-person psychology," concerned as it is with how worlds of inner experience and intersubjective fields mutually constitute one another.
A cardinal feature of the dynamic systems approach to development is that it categorically rejects teleological conceptions of preordained end-states toward which developmental trajectories are presumed to aim. Accordingly, developmentdoes not "know" whereit is going from the start.... There is no end-state otherthan theend of life itself.... Development is the outcomeof theself-organizing processes of continuously active living systems [italics added] . (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 44) Also rejected isthe idea, prominent inmuchpsychoanalytic developmental theory, that development unfolds according to some predetermined schema or epigenetic master plan:
Although behavior and development appear structured, there are no structures. Although behavior and development appearrule-driven, there are no rules. There is complexity. There is a multiple, parallel, and continuously dynamic interplay of perception and action, and a system that,by its thermodynamic nature, seeks certain stable solutions. Thesesolutionsemerge from relations, notfrom design. When the elementsof suchcomplex systems cooperate, they give riseto behaviorwith aunitary character, and thus to the illusion of structure. But the order is always executory, rather than rule-driven, allowing for the enormous sensitivity and flexibility of behaviorto organize and regrouparound task and context.... [Such organizationis] emergent and not designed [italics added] . (Thelen & Smith, 1994,p. xix) Rejection of teleological thinking and of the notion of preestablished develop mental programs has been a hallmark of what has come to be known as the intersubjective perspective in psychoanalysis (Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1994) . Psychoanalytic intersubjectivity theory is a field theory or systems theory that seeks to comprehend psychological phenomena not as products of isolated intrapsychic mechanisms and fixed intrapsychic structures, but as forming at the interface of reciprocally interacting worlds of experience (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) . From thisperspective, intrapsychic determinism giveswayto anunremitting contextualism for which "a dynamic [systems] account provides a biological rationale" (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. xxi) . With regard to psychological develop ment, my collaborators and I, along with Sander (1985) and Beebe and Lachmann (1988) , proposed that the organization of the child's experience must be seen as a propertyof the child-caregiver system of mutual regulation and, further, that it is the recurring patterns of intersubjective transaction within the developmental system that result in the establishment of invariant principles and themes that unconsciously organize the child's subsequent experiences. The forging of such principles and themes within the child-caregiver system is an example of dynami cally emergent form, of "pattern formation without a program" (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 71) . In this view of psychological development, we, like Stern (1985) , eschew traditional psychoanalytic assumptions about universally occurring devel opmental phases dominated by innately preprogrammed imagery and crises. Con trary to Kohut's (1984) idea that a self possesses an inherent design awaiting a responsive milieu that will enable it to unfold, it is our view that the trajectory of self-experience is shaped at every point in development by the intersubjective matrix in which it crystallizes (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) . In harmony with the dynamic tenet that "all mental activity is emergent, situated, [and] historical" (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. xxiii) , we hold that any psychological constellation can be grasped only in terms of its unique intersubjective history, the relational systems in which it originated and is continuing to be maintained.
All living systems arethermodynamically open systems in that order and pattern continue to emerge and evolve-that is, to "self-organize"-so long as there is a continual influx of energy. Dynamic systems theory is concerned with "how complex systems ... produce patterns that evolve in time" (p. 51) . A key idea is that "in order for biological systems to survive, all the components must be coordinated to an exquisite degree" (p. 52) . It is the cooperative interaction of elements that brings about "the soft and context-specific assembly of components [into] aself-organized pattern" (pp. 81-83) .1 Synergies of action, cooperativity of subsystems, and self-organization-these are the principles of emergent pattern formation in complex dynamic systems "that change over time, where novelty can be created, where the end-state is not coded anywhere" (p. 49) . The process of change within dynamic systems is nonlinear and discontinuous, as changing contexts and changing conditions within the system assemble the elements into radically different patterns of coordination unanticipated by priorconfigurations.
Open systems where many components are free to relateto one anotherin nonlinear ways are capableof remarkable properties. When sufficient energy is pumped into these systems, new, ordered structures may spontaneously appear that were not formerly apparent. What startedout as an aggregation of... individual parts with no particular or privileged relations may suddenly produce patterns in spaceand regu larities in time. The system may behave in highly complex, although ordered,ways, shifting from one pattern to another, clocking time, resisting perturbations, and generating elaborate structures. These emergent organizations are totally different from the elements that constitute the system, and the patterns cannot be predicted solely from the characteristics of the individualelements, (p. 54) The ideathat patterns are softassembled through thecooperative interaction of elementsstands in contrastwith the notion that such patternsarehardwired. Some individual elements ofadynamic system may be hardwired, but the organization of elementsintoa pattern or structure is soft assembled. DYNAMIC, DYADIC. INTERSUBJECTIVE SYSTEMS 341 The foregoing description of the self-organizing activity of living systems captures its fluid, nonlinear, multidimensional, and context-dependent character. The passage bears a remarkable resemblance to recent conceptualizations of analytic transferences as shifting, multiple dimensions of experience taking form within the patient-analyst interactive system (Lachmann & Beebe, 1992; Stolorow, Brandchaft, & Atwood, 1987; Stolorow & Lachmann, 1984/85) . Developmental longings, repetitive/conflictual/resistive aspects, and other relational configura tions continually move in and out ofthe foreground and background ofthe patient's experience in concert with the patient's specific perceptions of the analyst and the analyst's activities, and a parallel statement can be made about the analyst's transference experience with the patient. For me, the essence of transference analysis lies in the investigative and interpretive tracking of these oscillating figure-ground relationships among multiple dimensions of the transference as they "soft assemble" within the ongoing dynamic, dyadic, intersubjective system con stituted by the patient's and analyst's interacting worlds of experience. In this conceptualization the patterning of transference is fluid, nonlinear, multidimen sional, and dynamically emergent from the self-organizing activity of the pa tient-analyst system.
Other phenomena that have traditionally been central in psychoanalytic theoriz ing-such as conflict, trauma, and fantasy-can similarly be understood as emer gent properties ofintersubjective systems (see Stolorow & Atwood, 1992; Stolorow et al., 1987) . The dynamic unconscious itself has been reconceptualized in terms ofaffect states that have been defensively aborted or walled off because they evoked traumatogenic malattunement from caregivers. From this perspective, the very boundary between conscious and unconscious is revealed to be a fluid and evershifting one, a product of the changing responsiveness of the surround to different regions of the child's emotional experience. This idea of a fluid boundary assem bling within a dynamic, dyadic, intersubjective system contrasts sharply with the traditional notion of the repression barrier as a fixed intrapsychicstructure.
Another key idea in dynamic systems theory is the concept of an attractor state, a quasi-stable or preferred configuration for which the self-organizing activityof a system has an affinity: Complex, dynamic systems seek preferred behavioral modes as a function of the interactions of their internal components and their sensitivity to externalconditions. The attractorregime is only determined as the system is assembled.... There are no codes, prescriptions, schemata, or programs orchestrating the nature of the attractor or its trajectory.... Under different conditions, the components are free to assemble into other stable behavioral modes. (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 60) Attractor states vary greatly as to the degree of their stability. Some are so unstable that they are only fleetingly observed, whereas others are so stable that they give
